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Royalty Interest.' As of this writing the crucial Vela' litigation, remarked
in last year's Surveya as primarily concerned with the meaning of "market
value" in a typical gas royalty lease clause, remains undecided by the Texas
Supreme Court. Cited in last year's discussion of the case were two then
very recent federal cases suggesting the problem might be one for Natural
Gas Act jurisdiction in the case of gas sold interstate, rather than state law.
That primary jurisdiction reference, it is reported, has resulted in proceed-
ings before the Federal Power Commission in which there is yet no deci-
sion. These two federal cases, properly in this year's selection of cases, now
deserve some additional comment. They are the only federal cases meriting
special Texas attention in the current reporting period.
If there is no Federal Power Commission jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit
in Huber Corp. v. Denman4 and Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas
Co.' agrees with the civil appeals court in Vela that "market value" means
current, contemporary and shifting values unrelated to gas sales contract
values. In arriving at these values probative evidence is evaluated much as
in Vela except there is even more freedom given in establishing the founda-
tion for expert testimony, and it is said the impact of Federal Power Com-
mission ratemakings upon gas prices in general must be duly considered as
a modification of the traditional willing seller-willing buyer means of estab-
lishing market value. Additionally, the latter case demonstrates the help-
lessness of a gas lessee, controlling twenty per cent of a gas field, to in-
crease his takes from the field by unilaterally increasing the producer
nominations he makes to the Railroad Commission. The issue here was the
* B.Sc.L., University of Minnesota; LL.B., Columbia University. Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University.
'Cases where textual comment is deemed unwarranted are collected by footnotes under category
headings, some of which only approximate the category subject matter.
Clyde v. Hamilton, 414 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1967) involves a contest between a life tenant
(actually the administrator of his estate) and remaindermen as to entitlement to lease bonuses and
royalties. The usual rule giving bonuses and royalties to remaindermen after being invested for the
benefit of the life tenant during his lifetime, was followed. Also followed was the exception where,
if a lease was "opened" before creation of the life estate, bonus and royalties go entirely to the life
tenant. This exception is known as the "open mine" doctrine. Whether it applies if the property
was merely leased but without actual production until after the life estate commenced was not
in issue. However, Youngman v. Shular, 155 Tex. 437, 288 S.W.2d 495 (1956) holds mere leasing
is enough.
Read v. Britain, 414 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted, is concerned with in-
terpretation of some special language and hence not of general interest. It quite properly holds
that where a lessee is afforded in his lease alternative methods of accounting for royalty on casing-
head gas he may select one to the exclusion of the other. By no means so certain, however, is the
conclusion that, under the method selected, there was no obligation to pay for gas remaining after
separator processing and payment of royalty on the liquids obtained because such gas was not
sufficiently stripped to meet the definition of residue gas. The civil appeals court held the residue
gas royalty provision pertained only to the gas processing alternative not selected.
a Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
'Flittie, Oil and Gas, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 29 (1967).
4 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966).
5 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966).
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obligation owed royalty owners to produce and market increased quan-
tities of gas. In terms of the facts of Weymouth, it is quite clear there is
no duty to increase nominations beyond quantities which genuinely will be
produced and sold despite remand to give the royalty owners an oppor-
tunity to make a case for increased nominations if they can.
In Andretta v. West' the holder of a leasing power leased lands in which
existed a severed undivided one-quarter royalty interest. After the leasing
transaction, and unknown to the royalty owner, this lessor amended the
lease with an arrangement which could extend the lease beyond the pri-
mary term by paying what was denominated "lieu royalty" and measured
by a fraction of the production of a designated well on other property. Re-
versing the civil appeals court, which had analyzed the payment to be
rental, the supreme court held it to be royalty and the owner of the one-
quarter royalty thus entitled to his share. The opinion is based on several
factors: the payment is a money substitute for actual production, is based
on other actual production in a manner characteristic of lieu royalty, con-
tinues beyond the primary term, and uses the words of legal art "lieu roy-
alty." In short, the attributes pointing to royalty were catalogued to reach
the result. The case also determined that the lessor holder of the executive
power had an obligation to pay over his share to the royalty owner, upon
which obligation limitations did not commence to run until the royalty
owner actually learned the payments were being received and claimed con-
trary to his interest, or had information which would have led an ordinar-
ily prudent person to discover the situation.
Surface vs. Mineral Estate.7 Probably the most significant case pending be-
fore the supreme court as of this writing is Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker.! The
case involves a contest between the lessee of the mineral owner and the
surface owner in an important irrigation area concerning the right of the
lessee to produce fresh water from the lessee's own wells for use in water-
flooding operations. Instead of being a straight-on collision between min-
eral and surface ownerships, however, the litigation centers on interpre-
tation of the free use clause of a typical lease, which includes "water from
said land except water from Lessor's wells for all operations hereunder."
6415 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1967).
7 Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Razo, 409 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) deals with the duty
of the owner of a gas pipeline easement to mark pipeline crossings of known private roads and to
bury the line to a safe depth. In this case a large recovery was obtained by the employee of a sub-
contractor who had an easement right to use such a private road from its owner. Injury resulted
from an explosion when a bulldozer became stuck in the road over the pipeline and defendant's
pipeline was ripped in the effort to extricate it. For further discussion, see Keeton, Torts, this
Survey, at footnote 25.
Rendon v. Gulf Oil Corp., 414 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. involves
the grant of a temporary injunction to prevent the landowner-lessor's interference with building a
service road and preparation of a drill site. Probable right and degree of injury, not certainty that
the lessee would prevail on the merits, constitute the basis for temporary injunctions in these cases.
Coastal States Crude Gathering Co. v. Cummings, 415 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
error ref. n.r.e. involves the problem of construction of a pipeline easement to ascertain whether it
permitted the laying of additional lines within the easement. The use of the phrase "pipeline or
pipelines" in conjunction with added payments for additional lines made it easy to construe as a
multiple line grant.
8412 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
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Treating the phrase "all operations hereunder" as latently ambiguous, the
civil appeals court held the use of fresh water in such substantial quan-
tities as to impair the value of the surface estate (to which estate fresh
water pertains) as not within the intent of the parties to the lease. One
wonders what evidence, considering the small relative volumes of oil and
gas bearing formations in relation to the immense size of the Ogallala res-
ervoir from which the water would be drawn, justified the conclusion that
the surface estate would be substantially impaired. If this is not really so,
the fact that waterflooding was not practiced in the area at the time that
the lease was granted in 1946 should be no basis for denying it now.' In any
event, the case may not finally resolve the ultimate conflict between min-
eral and surface ownerships, though its outcome on appeal should show the
trend.
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Howell" the United States had condemned, and
owned the surface estate, which it had leased to an agricultural tenant. The
mineral estate was in other ownership. The owner of an adjacent leasehold
in Lake Texoma, desiring a surface location for directional drilling to a
bottom hole location beneath the lake, obtained consent for a surface loca-
tion from the United States which was given in the terms of "[W]e have
no objection to the location specified." Both the agricultural lessee and the
mineral owner's oil and gas lessee sought an injunction against drilling at
the location, which was granted. The decision did not state in whose right
the injunction was obtained. Because there is precedent in Texas for the
right of a surface owner to grant such a location over the objection of the
mineral owner," the case would best be viewed as an injunction granted in
the right of the prior agricultural lessee.
One civil appeals decision would be a curiosity except that it should
make people consider the content of lease forms currently used in order to
avoid problems in special issues submitted to the jury. The lease in issue
read only "necessary" rather than "reasonably necessary" in assessing the
use of the surface by a mineral lessee. An issue phrased "Do you find [the
lessee] made an unnecessary use of the surface . . ." was upheld against
a contention that the lessee had the right to use so much of the surface
as was reasonably necessary, and to have the issue phrased in that manner."
Holding that it is the burden of the surface owner affirmatively to prove
that the development purposes of the lessee could have been accomplished
while using less land, the supreme court reversed a civil appeals decision
that the building of a blacktop road and destruction of several hundred
trees and rutting of the surface by heavy trucks at a turnaround point,
without more, constituted evidence from which a finding of excessive use
could be made." This case may turn out to represent a significant added
burden of proof for surface owners in these situations.
Cf. Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp., 182 F.2d 286 (5th Cit. 1950).
0407 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error
ref. n.r.e.
' Texaco, Inc. v. Faris, 413 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
'
3 Humle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967).
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Termination of the Lease.14 The most intricate case decided by the Texas
Supreme Court in the period under survey is Sunac Petroleum Corp. v.
Parkes."' The remote assignor of a lease had retained a 1/16 of a 7/8 over-
riding royalty. It was stated that the assignee and his assigns had no obli-
gation to retain or develop the lease, but that the overriding interest at-
tached to all extensions or renewals of the lease. The lease contained a typ-
ical thirty-day continuous drilling clause and a typical sixty-day additional
drilling clause. It also contained a gas-only pooling clause. Pursuant to this
clause there was drilled an off-lease pooled unit well which produced oil
instead of gas. Thirteen days after its completion and well beyond the end
of the set primary term another well was commenced on the lease lands
which resulted in oil production independent of the unit. About a year
after completion of this second oil well the defendant leaseholder, doubt-
ing the efficacy of his lease, took a new lease, paying a consideration of
$27,000. Defendant paid overriding royalty on the production from the
second well for about five months after its completion, but thereafter re-
fused to pay, contending the lands were held under the new lease and not
the first lease upon which the overriding royalty depended for existence.
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the thirty-day clause was not im-
plemented because it was limited to drilling and reworking operations on
the pooled unit well drilled through the end of the primary term. Nor was
the sixty-day additional drilling clause implemented because the first well
could not affect the lease habendum clause since it was an oil well and
hence could not be connected with the lease by the gas-only pooling clause.
Additionally, the well did not result in a dry hole. Hence, when the second
well was drilled on-lease to production the lease had already terminated.
The next point was whether the extension or renewal rights of the over-
riding royalty owner attached the overriding royalty to the second lease
as a matter of legal construction. The court held that it did not, pointing
to the substantially different terms of the new lease and, more pertinently,
to the fact that the second lease was not taken until more than a year
after expiration by operation of law of the first lease. Thus, it was con-
cluded, the new lease could not be defined as an extension or renewal lease.
The court also considered whether there was nevertheless a violation of
trust and confidence sufficient to cause recognition in equity of the over-
riding royalty through the device of a constructive trust despite its demise
in law. The court held that where the duty to perpetuate the lease was
expressly negatived and, more pertinently, because there was no fiduciary
or confidential relationship between the overriding royalty owner and
lease owner to be found in these facts, resort to the constructive trust
remedy could not be had. Finally, since there was no prejudice or change of
'4 Eubank v. Twin Mountain Oil Corp., 406 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
enunciates two well-established points: A lessee whose lease has expired is not entitled to recover
the cost of wells drilled, nor may he remove casing if there is a reasonable possibility the wells
drilled may be made productive. Instead he must accept the reasonable value of the casing. The
case does not express it, but presumably this means the net value of casing after deducting salvage
costs. Another case to the same effect is Patton v. Rogers, 417 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'5416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967).
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position, the court held the payment of the overriding royalty for sev-
eral months did not work an estoppel. There was a vigorous dissent by
three justices.
One case important for its implications is Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc."0 The case involved a lease which was to continue so long as produc-
tion in paying quantities continued, with a clause permitting continuation
beyond this point if the lessee commenced additional drilling or rework-
ing operations within thirty days. The lessee ceased production on Decem-
ber 12, 1962. Production was resumed thirteen months later after a second-
ary recovery waterflood unit was formed. The court refused to view the
cessation, which resulted from normal decline, as temporary, which seems
correct. But it also refused to apply the unique Texas rule permitting hold-
ing beyond the cessation of paying production if a reasonable operator, for
the purpose of making a profit, would continue so to hold.17 This reasoning,
first found in a 1966 civil appeals opinion criticized in last year's Survey, 8
seems to be that the thirty-day clause ousts any possibility of a longer hold-
ing than permitted by that clause. It is submitted that this clause, now
standard in most leases, should not be read as exclusive, but only as one per-
missive means of continuing the lease. If this interpretation prevails when
squarely tested in the supreme court, it will greatly increase the problem
of holding leases valuable for potential second recovery through a period
of bona fide negotiations to accomplish the unitizations needed before the
secondary recovery projects can be undertaken. 9
In another case a gas well was completed in a lease but shut in for lack
of a market. The lease contained a shut-in royalty clause which, however,
permitted holding pursuant to it for only two years beyond the end of the
primary term of the lease. Two years beyond the end of the primary term
there was yet no regular sale, but the lessee had run a half-inch line from
the gas well to an oil well in another lease where the working interest own-
ership was virtually identical. There some gas was used as fuel for treating
the oil, for which there was an agreement to pay a minimum of $100
a month for the gas used. This agreement was examined and found not to
constitute a legitimate market. Since it is a peculiarity of gas production
that it must be currently marketed to be produced in paying quantities
(unlike oil, except in the most unusual circumstances gas cannot be pro-
duced and stored), the lease was held to have terminated. °
18417 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
'Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959). See also Skelly Oil Co. v. Archer,
163 Tex. 336, 356 S.W.2d 774 (1961).
SHall v. McWilliams, 404 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error 'ref. n.r.e., noted in
Flittie, Oil & Gas, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 29, 35 (1967).
"9 The civil appeals decisions now exhibit considerable conflict. See Fick v. Wilson, 349 S.W.2d
622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e. It has been suggested that the rule of Clifton v.
Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959) requires actual continuing physicall operations even
if not in paying quantity. That is not the reasoning of any of the civil appeals cases. It does not
seem justifiable to modify habendum clause effects in so whimsical a manner; either lessee's attitude
should hold the lease, or it should not. Certainly production below the level of paying quantities
is in law no less antagonistic to the habendum clause than no current production whatever.
20 Patton v. Rogers, 417 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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Conveyancing.21 In a novel application of the Duhig rule a civil appeals
court held that a grantor, in breach of his mineral warranty in the east half
of a tract of land, could be forced to cover the breach with minerals other-
wise validly reserved in the west half of the tract." The east and west
halves both had been conveyed in the same warranty deed, and it so hap-
pened there were exactly enough west half minerals to cover the east half
deficiency. It also was stipulated that the minerals throughout the east and
west halves had the same value. These coincidences tend somewhat to ob-
scure and make plausible what, on closer analysis, seems a very erroneous
holding. Warranty of title is essentially a contractual undertaking. It is
not easy to justify the Duhig rule as it presently exists. To permit its ex-
tension to operate upon lands other than those in which the deficiency
exists--even a west half tract contiguous to the deficient east half tract-
will not bear analysis.
Executive Powers. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher' involves these facts:
After severance into plaintiff's separate ownership of a 1/16 royalty inter-
est from tract one, defendant, the mineral owner in tracts one and two,
leased both in the same lease. Plaintiff had no interest in tract two. The
lease contained an entirety clause. Tract two was placed in a unit which
became productive from a well in other unit lands. The court disposed of
any right arising from the pooling by pointing to the established Texas
rule that the holder of the executive power cannot pool severed royalty
and mineral interests, though he can lease them. By no means so secure,
however, is the conclusion that there cannot be participation based on the
entirety clause. The "cannot pool" rule rests on the technical property
effects inherent in the Texas cross-conveyance theory of pooling,' whereas
an entirety clause is contractual, having no effect on the vested property
ownerships but merely sharing produced proceeds. Of course, it could be
determined that inclusion of an entirety clause is also beyond the power of
the executive holder, but this would seem to require a different analysis
from that given.
Another case involved a leasing by the holder of the executive power
in the same general circumstances as those described in the previous case. 5
When production was obtained from the tract in which the royalty owner
had no interest, the contention was made that since there could be no pool-
ing, the effect was to sever the two tracts in the lease into two separate
leaseholds, with separate obligations to obtain paying production in each
tract before the end of the primary term. This was rejected. Though at
21 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Alvord, 416 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1967) is a holding construing particular
language in an assignment of leases in which were reserved 16 wells "until [the assignor] elects to
abandon the same." "All right, title and interest" was said to be transferred. A contention that the
effect was to reserve minerals down to the depth of the wells reserved was rejected. The court
held that there being no ambiguity, no parol evidence to vary the plain language construction
could be considered.
2Hanson v. Pelham, 413 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
23410 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
"See the leading case of Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943).
21Mathews v. Sun Oil Co., 411 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
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first blush it seems a hard rule that a lease is perpetuated by production in
which an interest owner cannot share because of the effects of the non-
apportionment rule in circumstances such as these, that rule is well estab-
lished law. Considering the problems which would be created in assembling
acreage into leaseable blocks should it be overturned, it is advisable that
the present rule be continued.
Delay Rentals." Skelly Oil Co. v. Kidd" is a mispayment of delay rentals
case. The mispayment came about because the lessor requested, the lessee
drafted, and the lessor signed and delivered a change of depository form
incorrectly reading "The First State Bank, Eustage, Texas" instead of
"Eustace, Texas." A payment mailed to the incorrect address was delivered
to the First State Bank, Carthage, Texas. Time in which to make a correct
payment then ran out without the lessee being aware of the error. The
payment was held to be sufficient, apparently on the grounds that for-
feitures are abhorred. This is not sound analysis. Failure correctly to pay
delay rentals is no forfeiture situation; it is automatic termination of the
leasehold estate granted. Lessor's involvement in the error, however, seems
enough to charge him with it, since the lessee complied as directed and de-
livered the payment to the mails, an independent agency.
Pooling Agreements. Two cases make it clear that lease pooling clauses can
be implemented to avoid the drilling of wells in the acreage affected despite
a right under the regulatory scheme to a well at the location. In one case
the pooling of a small tract to a tract already containing an existing well
was upheld despite the fact that the small tract otherwise was entitled to its
own well." The second case involved a piercement salt dome field where
there is no restriction on well density. Pooling to avoid drilling the par-
ticular lands subject to the lease was a valid implementation of the pooling
clause in these circumstances."
Common Purchasers Act. The perennial question of whether a lawsuit can
be brought involving a regulatory area independently of a determination
by the Railroad Commission that a violation exists is presented by a case
where the civil appeals court held there could be no suit for discrimination
damages under the Common Purchaser Act unless there was outstanding
a Commission order determining that discrimination exists.' On the par-
2 Ploeger v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 416 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
decided that delay rental payments made to the trustees rather than beneficiaries of a trust pur-
suant to an ambiguous judgment were sufficient to keep a lease in force. Chief reliance was on the
rule that a lessee cannot have thrust upon him the burden of construing at his peril an ambiguous
instrument.
Meier v. Suntex Oil & Gas Co., 413 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) enunciated the well-
established rule that the assignee of property subject to a lease has no claim on delay rentals or
royalties until he supplies the lessee with evidences of his ownership as required by the lease. The
non-apportionment consequences of a partial assignment by vertical segregation out of a larger
property subject to lease also were noted.
27417 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.2SExpando Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 407 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.'.e.
" Banks v. Mecom, 410 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"




ticular facts the Commission had ordered extension of a gathering line for
the benefit of a producer, then withdrew its order when another pipeline
indicated it would make the extension. It seems more reasonable that the
cause of action for discrimination damages specifically granted by section
11 c of the Acte' is intended to be and can be implemented independently
of any Commission action.
Subsurface Trespass.' In Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. v. Schlumberger Well
Surveying Corp.' the purchaser of properties, dependent for their produc-
tion on illegal slanted wells, claimed against the well surveying company
that had surveyed for the previous owners. There was alleged a conspir-
acy between this company and the prior owners to conceal the facts of
deviation, with the result that the purchaser was damaged. Pointing to
evidence showing what the defendant must have known as a result of its
surveying activities, and denying the claim that sale of the properties was
not a foreseeable damage consequence at the time the surveys were per-
formed, the civil appeals court held the case should not have been with-
drawn from the jury because there existed a fact issue "as to whether
defendant, a member of a conspiracy, is liable to plaintiff."
State Lands.' An important decision concerned the leasing power of the
owner of the surface estate under the Relinquishment Act of 1919."s These
owners are authorized to give oil and gas leases in ordinary commercial
form for bonus, rental, and royalty of not less than 1/8, half of which they
may keep as statutory leasing agents for the State. In this case such an
owner included in the lease an additional clause entitling him, in his dis-
cretion, to acquire a 1/16 working interest out of the 7/8 working interest.
The lease was held invalid on the public policy ground that this term was
" TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, § lc (1962).
"
2 Garvin v. Goldsmith, 406 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. is a case con-
cerned with damages for the sale of properties dependent for their production upon illegal slanted
wells. The realty measure of damages in terms of the difference between the property as represented
and its actual value was held proper, and a special issue inquiring of value "if the wells on the
lease had been legally producing oil at the rate at which they were producing oil" was upheld as
sufficient to establish what had been represented.
State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966) involves what constitutes a civil penalty day
for operating an illegal slanted well. The court held that any day a well is maintained in an
operable, unplugged condition, whether or not actually produced, is a penalty day; also that this
is true' whether or not there is actual scienter concerning the illegal bottom hole location. The
elements making a mining partnership, the jurisdiction of district courts in civil penalties cases
pursuant to TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6036 (1962) and a conclusion that well location
rules pertain to bottom hold locations also are considered in reaching the main holding.
334 1 7 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'4Noel v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 414 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) was a contest between
the lessee from the state of lands asserted to constitute a vacancy and a mineral claimant relying
on the patent issued. The problem was whether the original survey, which gave rise to no vacancy,
would rule the patent or, instead, a regular subsequent resurvey filed with the state prior to patent
which did give rise to the vacancy. Following well-established rules the subsequent resurvey was
held to measure the extent of the patent grant, and the vacancy in fact existed.
Duval Corp. v. Sadler, 407 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1966) deals with the leasing by the state for
sulphur of public free school lands which have been sold with a reservation of minerals in the
state. There is extended discussion of the Texas mineral leasing acts and the differing procedures
under which oil and gas are leased.
' State v. Standard, 414 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1967).
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beyond the surface owner's authority. However, since this owner had
acted in good faith it was held that he had power to execute a subsequent
valid lease.
Drainage. The supreme court opinion, Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury," is a
very brief per curiam opinion according no reversible error to the prior
civil appeals opinion."' However, it may be of much greater portent than
its brevity and the writ treatment suggests. The supreme court suggests
that a lessee who is also the draining operator on adjacent lands cannot
modify his duty reasonably to protect against drainage with an express
covenant clause in the lease of a nature more favorable to the lessee. The
lease contained a provision imposing a duty to drill an offset well in the
event a draining well was located within a specified distance. The lessee
maintained that the draining well was outside this specified distance and
that, since the lessee also drilled the draining well, the reasonable operator
duty was not applicable. The court rejected this contention. It was the
view of the lower court (which was not reversed) that such modifying
effect must be unmistakably clear, but that court did not say the reason-
able operator duty standard could not be diminished. It is unfortunate to
have an area of law potentially productive of so much conflict as this
thrown into unstable flux by so cursory a treatment.
An unleased tenant in common of productive property, owning an un-
divided 1/12 mineral interest, sued the operating lessee of the other 11/12
interest, alleging failure of the operator to protect against drainage. The
precise complaint was that an alternate method followed in testing wells
for allowable purposes produced lower allowables than did the method fol-
lowed by others in adjacent competitive properties. Both methods were
permitted by the Railroad Commission. Relief was denied, chiefly on the
ground that the operator owed no duty to a mere tenant in common.
Added was the consideration that the method followed was legal until
and unless changed by the Railroad Commission, and not to be collaterally
attacked in court proceedings. 8
3"410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1966).
" Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
" Zimmerman v. Texaco, Inc., 409 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r.e., 413
S.W.2d 387 (1967). In the short per curiam opinion of the supreme court, the view of the
civil appeals court that such a suit could not be brought in the county where the property was
located was rejected, thereby removing this alternate basis for denial of the claim from the civil
appeals opinion.
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